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Abstract 14 
 15 
Plant weeds, pests and diseases comprise significant threats to pastoral agriculture in New 16 
Zealand. The extent of damage incurred by New Zealand’s agricultural industry from these 17 
weed and pest threats varies significantly depending on the response implemented, and the 18 
technologies available. This paper assesses the projected economic impact of three individual 19 
potential failures in plant protection, specifically the spread of clover root weevil, giant 20 
buttercup and glassy-winged sharpshooter across New Zealand, and the potential mitigation 21 
of economic loss caused by these failures through various response methods. This assessment 22 
is carried out with the use of a national-level agricultural production and value model, based 23 
on data from the Ministry for Primary Industries farm models and the Lincoln Trade and 24 
Environment Model, an international trade and environment model. The model projects 25 
economic impact on agriculture until 2030, comparing the differences in economic impact 26 
between business as usual without the advent of each threat and then with the advent of each 27 
threat alongside various potential responses. The modelled responses cover firstly the most 28 
probable responses, and secondly the use of biological control agents, in the form of a 29 
parasitoid or bio-herbicide control. The results show that biological controls offer the most 30 
effective and feasible responses to the modelled threats to pastoral agriculture compared with 31 
other responses.  32 
 33 
 34 
 35 
  36 
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 Introduction 37 
 38 
New Zealand is particularly vulnerable to the impact of weeds, pests and diseases (Goldson et 39 
al., 1997) and, significantly, it has been estimated that over 90% of this country’s invertebrate 40 
pests are alien invasive species (Barlow and Goldson, 2002). Despite this, the severity of pest 41 
impacts is often overlooked as a source of economic loss and environmental degradation 42 
because the impacts of pest damage are frequently being attributed to other causes such as 43 
poor seed strike. This misattribution can occur for a variety of reasons, including the often 44 
cryptic or camouflaged appearance of pest species, concealed feeding sites (e.g. root-feeding 45 
or stem-mining habits) and ambiguous damage symptoms. The latter particularly applies to 46 
pathogens which can produce very non-specific symptoms. Unsurprisingly, therefore, and in 47 
an attempt to correct such misapprehension over recent years, quite a number of contributions 48 
have been made by bioprotection researchers themselves to produce monetary estimates of 49 
damage. In particular, this has pertained to analyses into pasture/forage pests (Prestidge 50 
Barker & Pottinger,1991; Goldson, Proffitt & Muscroft-Taylor, 1993; Barlow and Goldson, 51 
2002; Goldson, Rowarth & Caradus, 2005) and weeds (Bourdôt et al., 2012; 2013). However, 52 
this has also generally applied to the land-based industries (Suckling and Popay, 1993). 53 
Particularly spectacular estimates have been made of the financial impacts of pasture damage. 54 
This is simply because 50% of the land area of New Zealand is pasture and the multipliers are 55 
therefore very high. As a result, such estimates have been met with scepticism often because 56 
they have been generated without the imprimatur of well recognised economists and therefore 57 
have apparently not always been accepted. A notable exception to this was the work of 58 
Bertram (1999). Partly in response to such circumstances this contribution seeks to confirm 59 
via standard econometric methods earlier economic estimates of impacts based on a pasture 60 
pest, a pasture weed and an estimate of the likely impact of a potential pest species of grapes. 61 
 62 
Primary industries are of high importance to New Zealand, in particular the agricultural 63 
sector, contributing $9.4 billion to GDP, or 6.4% of total GDP in 2012 (Statistics NZ 2013). 64 
One of the most significant threats to New Zealand’s agriculture is the occurrence of failures 65 
in plant protection; these can be pests, weeds or plant diseases becoming more important or 66 
developing from new invasions. One recent example of a failure in plant protection is the 67 
PSA outbreak on kiwifruit, which has been estimated to cost between $310 and $410 million 68 
to New Zealand agriculture, over 5 years (Greer & Saunders, 2012).  69 
This project demonstrates the economic cost to agriculture in New Zealand of the spread of 70 
various biological pests, weeds and diseases. To estimate this, a model has been developed to 71 
map these economic impacts and the economic value of different mitigation and biocontrol 72 
responses to challenges, thus showing value of having strong bioprotection science to 73 
anticipate, meet and mitigate these challenges and threats.  74 
This paper focuses solely on the effects of challenges to New Zealand’s pastoral industries, 75 
other impacts on New Zealand’s biodiversity profile, or potential and flow-on effects to other 76 
industries have not been accounted for.  77 
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  78 
Methodology 79 
Three scenarios of damaging pests and weeds in New Zealand agriculture were modelled; 80 
these represent a range of current and potential challenges to agriculture in New Zealand. The 81 
selected scenarios are detailed in Table 1. 82 
 83 
Table 1: Scenario descriptions 84 
Scenario Responses 
# Name First Second 
1 Clover root weevil Increased N use Parasitoid biological control 
2 Giant buttercup Increased herbicide Bio-herbicide  
3 Glassy-winged sharpshooter Replanting vines Bio-herbicide 
 85 
Each scenario models the outcome from a lack of plant protection for a particular farm type 86 
in New Zealand, and presents up to three different approaches for mitigating the negative 87 
effects on production. As presented, the mitigation approaches are informed by the literature 88 
surrounding each case and personal communication with scientists in the relevant fields, thus 89 
describing the most useful responses available or potentially available within the modelling 90 
timeframe. The mitigation responses cover approaches such as the use of biological controls 91 
for pests or weeds, changes in farm systems and farm inputs and/or the use of specific 92 
pesticides or herbicides. In each of these cases the cost of implementation and the beneficial 93 
effect of the implementation are accounted for.  94 
Quantifying the incidences and spread of a pest or weed, and the probable mitigation 95 
responses was achieved by taking the data and projections from the literature and personal 96 
communication with plant protection specialists where available. Some scenarios, however, 97 
also encompass potential responses to these challenges that are outside New Zealand’s 98 
experience, for example a scenario deals with an incursion of a pest until now unknown to 99 
New Zealand agriculture, or mitigation technologies that are still in the preliminary stages of 100 
development or have yet to be released for wide-scale application. In these cases, estimates 101 
were derived from case-studies of foreign incursions and with the guidance of specialists.  102 
Model 103 
An economic impact assessment model was developed to quantify the effects of these 104 
challenges to plant protection. The model uses both data from the Lincoln Trade and 105 
Environment Model (LTEM) and the Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI) farm monitoring 106 
reports. The LTEM component gives national level projections derived from trading 107 
conditions for production and price figures for agricultural commodities up to 2020. These 108 
projections are then disaggregated to the farm level and normalised to the budgets for MPI’s 109 
model farms as of the 2011 farm monitoring reports (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry: 110 
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 MAF, 2011a; MAF, 2011b; MAF 2011c; MAF 2011d). The approach allows for both the 111 
projections and international trade effects of the LTEM’s national focus to be applied to farm 112 
level profits, taken from MPI. The model currently projects to 2030, using linear 113 
extrapolations of the projection given by the LTEM. 114 
The effects of pests and weeds, and the recovery scenarios can be modelled as changes to 115 
either total production, price, total or per hectare income, total or per hectare cost or stocking 116 
rates. These changes can be applied to any year within the model’s operating timeframe, or 117 
gradually over a designated time period.  118 
The model gives outputs in profitability by commodity and scenario at an aggregate national 119 
level, using a discount rate of 8%. Also presented are the losses for each scenario compared 120 
to the baseline, and the benefits of the recovery scenarios compared to the initial loss 121 
scenario. These results are given for both the entire period of modelling and per hectare per 122 
year.  123 
Scenario 1  124 
 125 
Clover Root Weevil 126 
The clover root weevil (Sitona lepidus) is a pasture pest native to Europe which was 127 
discovered in New Zealand in 1996 (Gerard et al., 2007a), and by 2005 was present in 128 
pastures across the North Island (Gerard et al., 2009). Currently the weevil is spreading 129 
through the South Island. 130 
All stages of the weevil affect white clover and this has two impacts on pastures. First is the 131 
loss of dry matter through the depletion of clover due to feeding. Second is the loss in 132 
nitrogen fixation also due to rhizobial root nodule damage. 133 
In most assessments of the effects of this weevil, estimates of the loss to pasture have been 134 
based on records of damage found on Waikato dairy farms. In such farms, the weevil causes 135 
up to 35% reductions in total dry matter and up to 83% less nitrogen fixed as a result of 136 
clover loss (Gerard, Hackell & Bell, 2007a). These effects would be less severe nationally 137 
due to lower clover content of pastures in other regions. Because of this, a 10% reduction in 138 
the production of milk solids, beef and sheep, has been used for this report. This is the same 139 
approach that was used in the medium impact scenario from the New Zealand Institute of 140 
Economic Research (NZIER)’s earlier assessment of the impacts of the clover root weevil 141 
(Wear & Andrews, 2005).  142 
The weevil is thought to spread at a rate of 35 km/year on average (Willoughby & Addison, 143 
1997). Applying this to the map of current weevil distribution throughout the South Island 144 
developed by AgResearch (Figure 1) we can assume that all of New Zealand pasture will be 145 
affected by the weevil by 2014 and equilibrium populations of the weevil will be fully 146 
established by 2015.  147 
 148 
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 Figure 1: Current South Island distribution of CRW & its biological control agent.149 
 150 
Source: Phillips et al., 2013. 151 
Response scenarios 152 
For the impact of the clover root weevil on New Zealand agriculture, two mitigation 153 
responses are modelled. The first is an increase in the use of nitrogen fertiliser the second is 154 
spread of a weevil parasitoid as a biological control agent.  155 
Response 1: Increased use of nitrogen 156 
One current response to the damage incurred by the spread of the weevil is the use extra 157 
nitrogen fertiliser to offset the reduced nitrogen fixation resulting from clover damage, and 158 
the loss in consumable dry matter on pasture. The assumptions and data informing this 159 
mitigation scenario were taken from the NZIER’s report on the economic impact of clover 160 
root weevil (Wear & Andrews, 2005) and the 2010 Lincoln Financial Budget Manual 161 
(Pangborn, 2010). It is assumed that clover naturally releases 200 kg nitrogen/year/hectare, 162 
and that clover root weevil prevents nitrogen fixation in 50% of the nodules. Therefore, 100 163 
kg of nitrogen must be replaced via fertiliser to maintain pasture production at normal levels. 164 
The costs associated with such extra application of nitrogen fertiliser are detailed in Table 2.  165 
 166 
 167 
 168 
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 Table 2: Cost for replacing nitrogen (N) lost due to clover root weevil nodule damage 169 
N deficiency 100 Kg/ha/yr 
Urea (46% N) required 217.39 Kg/ha/yr 
Price of Urea (FBM) $620/t 
Application Cost @ 
$48.20/ha (FBM) 
$10.48/ha 
Cartage Cost for 30km 
@ $16/t (FBM) 
$3.48/ha 
Total Cost $148.74/ha 
 FBM: Farm Budget Manual (Pangborn 2010) 170 
 171 
 172 
The use of extra nitrogen to mitigate the effects of clover root weevil has been shown to 173 
increase total pasture production, but cause a slight decrease in total metabolisable energy 174 
(White & Gerard, 2006). This was found to be due to a reduction in clover content of the 175 
pasture from weevil activity, but an increase in total ryegrass due to the application of 176 
nitrogen. For the purposes of modelling we have assumed this to equate to pre-weevil 177 
production levels, occurring as a lagged response, one year after the full establishment of the 178 
weevil. 179 
This response is sensitive to the cost of nitrogen fertiliser and the capability of land to bear 180 
additional nutrient load. This scenario does not take into account the negative groundwater 181 
effects, which using extra nitrogen fertiliser on a national level would incur. Tait and Cullen 182 
(2006) estimate the external costs of dairy farming in Canterbury to surface and groundwater, 183 
air, biodiversity and human health at $28.7 to $45 million per annum. Of this amount, 184 
$155,000 per annum is the specific impact on surface and groundwater, which would be 185 
affected by increased nitrogen use on farm. Greenhouse gas emissions per hectare would also 186 
increase with additional fertiliser use. Calculating the impacts from the increase of nitrogen 187 
fertiliser applied in this scenario would require additional resources beyond the scope of this 188 
project.  189 
Furthermore, current discussion around the environmental impacts of agricultural use of 190 
nitrogen, suggest that limits to the use of nitrogen on farm may be implemented in the near 191 
future by regional councils. Such limits would make this scenario an unfeasible option for 192 
response to the incursion of the clover root weevil.  193 
  194 
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 Response 2 & 3: Biological control 195 
The second modelled response to the impacts of clover root weevil is based on the use of a 196 
biological control agent, the wasp Microctonus aethiopoides (Irish strain), which is a 197 
parasitoid of the weevil (Goldson, Rowarth & Caradus, 2005; McNeill et al., 2006). The 198 
wasp usually lays one egg into each adult weevil, rendering the female infertile and killing it 199 
upon the emergence of the fifth instar larva. The wasp was released in 2006 and has since 200 
been established in most New Zealand regions, spreading at about 15km a year which is 201 
20km/year slower than its host.  202 
For the modelling exercise the biological control is presumed to have been introduced at the 203 
start of the modelling timeframe, and established nationwide in 2018, 3 years later than the 204 
weevil. Once established and accommodating any associated density-dependent processes, 205 
the Irish wasp is assumed to lead to yields of up to 80% of the original potential production. 206 
As the level of control given by the Irish wasp varies, two scenarios have been modelled: the 207 
first, a lower estimate of 60% of original yields, the second an upper estimate of 80% of the 208 
original pasture yield.  209 
This biological control is modelled as having no additional cost to farmers.  210 
Results 211 
Figure 2 illustrates the outputs of the model for the clover root weevil impact scenarios. The 212 
base scenario shows the business-as-usual projections from the LTEM for New Zealand’s 213 
pastoral sector without any impact from clover root weevil. The initial scenario shows these 214 
projections with the damage caused by the incursion and eventual establishment of the clover 215 
root weevil in New Zealand pastures. Three recovery scenarios are shown in Figure 2: 216 
additional N use (+ N use) shows the effect of extra nitrogen fertiliser to compensate for the 217 
decrease in clover N fixation and total dry matter, and biological control 60% and 80% show 218 
the establishment of the parasitoid biological control giving yields at 60% and 80% of clover 219 
root weevil, respectively.  220 
Figure 2: Clover root weevil’s impact on New Zealand pastoral profits until 2030  221 
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  222 
Table 3 shows the total loss from the incursion of clover root weevil within the timeframe of 223 
the modelling exercise at over $11 billion. Nitrogen replacement or the first recovery scenario 224 
would mitigate over $5 billion worth of losses, whilst the full establishment of the parasitoid 225 
biological control at by 2018 would mitigate over $6 billion NZD at 60% parasitism. At the 226 
80% figure this amounts to the parasitoid biological control being worth $400-$500 million 227 
per year. 228 
Table 3: Total change in pastoral profits 2012-2030, for a range of clover root weevil 229 
scenarios 230 
 
Total 
(milNZD) 
Mitigation 
(milNZD) 
Clover root weevil -11,467 - 
Additional N use -6,156 5,311 
Biological control 
60% 
-5,054 6,413 
Biological control 
80% 
-3,278 8,189 
 231 
Figure 3 shows the total losses incurred by clover root weevil against the mitigation resulting 232 
from the three response scenarios. The 80% biological control has the greatest mitigation, 233 
whereas the additional use of nitrogen and the 60% biological control give roughly the same 234 
mitigation rate by 2030. 235 
 236 
Figure 3: Total loss and mitigation in pastoral profits 2012-2030, for clover root weevil 237 
scenarios 238 
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  239 
 240 
Table 4: Total change in pastoral profits annuitized, for clover root weevil scenarios 241 
 
Total 
(milNZD) 
Mitigation 
(milNZD) 
Clover root weevil -604 - 
Additional N use -324 280 
Biological control 
60% 
-266 338 
Biological control 
80% 
-173 431 
 242 
In order to further break down and illustrate these results Table 4 presents the profits for each 243 
scenario annually, and Table 5 shows the annuitized profits by hectare. Clover root weevil is 244 
then expected to reduce pastoral profits on average by $81 per hectare, where additional N 245 
could mitigate about half of this, and the biological control between 55% and 72%.  246 
 247 
Table 5: Total change in pastoral profits annuitized per ha, for clover root weevil 248 
scenarios 249 
 
Total 
(NZD) 
Mitigation 
(NZD) 
Clover root weevil -81.36 - 
Additional N use -43.68 37.68 
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 Biological control 
60% 
-35.86 45.50 
Biological control 
80% 
-23.26 58.10 
 250 
 251 
Scenario 2  252 
 253 
Giant Buttercup 254 
Giant buttercup (Ranunculus acris) is a weed currently present in pastures in six of the 16 255 
dairying regions of New Zealand. The weed is unpalatable to ruminants and thus causes a 256 
drop in the metabolisable content of pasture land as cattle avoid the weed and pasture 257 
surrounding it. In this way the giant buttercup is thought to cost the New Zealand dairy 258 
industry $156 million per year (Bourdôt & Saville, 2010). The weed is expected to eventually 259 
spread throughout New Zealand pasturelands, albeit slowly. The following scenarios assume 260 
the weed will have spread across New Zealand by 2027.  261 
Giant buttercup also occurs on sheep and beef land; however, here it does not become a 262 
problem weed “usually persisting as stunted plants that fail to reach above the pasture 263 
canopy” (Bourdôt & Lamoureaux, 2002). Thus, giant buttercup is modelled as only affecting 264 
dairy pastures. 265 
A study on the economic impacts of giant buttercup (Bourdôt 2003) uses 33.24% as an 266 
estimate of loss of usable dry matter. The loss in production from giant buttercup nationwide 267 
is based on this estimate in the modelled scenarios. 268 
Response 1: Extra herbicide use 269 
The first modelled response to the spread of giant buttercup is based on the use of a 270 
flumetsulam herbicide. This herbicide is currently one of the most effective agents for 271 
controlling giant buttercup. Prior to this the phenoxy herbicide 2-methyl-4-272 
chlorophenoxyacetic acid (MCPA) had been used to control the weed; however, this 273 
chemical has been losing its effectiveness, thereby requiring continously increasing rates of 274 
application as resistance has increased. Bourdôt & Lamoureaux (2002) noted that MCPA 275 
treatment would need to be withheld from a resistant population for 28 years prior to a return 276 
of level of buttercup susceptibility that would give effective control. 277 
Harris & Husband (1997) showed that annual repeat application of flumetsulam at label rates 278 
of 50g/ha over consecutive years provided 80% control of giant buttercups after 4 years. 279 
These figures have been adopted in the model used in this contribution, along with per 280 
hectare application costs as detailed in Table 6, using current label rates for giant buttercup 281 
control of 65g/ha with a flumetsulam herbicide. This is an underestimate of cost as, over 282 
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 time, resistance is likely to occur requiring application rates of the herbicide exceeding label 283 
rates, thus increasing total cost.  284 
 285 
Table 6: Per hectare (ha) cost of applying flumetsulam 286 
Flumetsulam (Preside) 
required 
65g/ha 
Spraying Oil (Uptake) 
required 
1L/ha 
Cost of Flumetsulam 
(Preside) & Spraying Oil  
$44.85/ha 
Average ground application 
cost 
$26/ha 
Total Cost $70.85/ha 
 287 
Response 2: Biological control 288 
One potential alternative response to the spread of giant buttercup is the application of a 289 
naturally-occuring fungus, Sclerotinia sclerotiorum, which can infect and kill buttercups.  290 
The fungus has been found to cause 75% plant mortality rates in controlled studies, and 50% 291 
and 57% plant mortality in dairy pastures (Cornwallis et al., 1999; Green et al., 1993 Harvey 292 
& Bourdôt, 2001). Pasture plants are thought to be more resistant to infection, being older 293 
and larger than their counterparts in controlled environments. Currently, methods are being 294 
explored to increase the mortality rate in pastures. For this modelling exercise, a 50% 295 
mortality rate of the giant buttercup from the application of S. sclerotiorum has been adopted. 296 
Under this assumption it can be estimated that if the fungal biological control agent is applied 297 
in the field for six years, the giant buttercup would thereafter have a minimal effect on 298 
production. 299 
 300 
For modelling purposes it is assumed that the S. sclerotiorum-based bio-pesticide has been 301 
developed to the extent that it is useful for commercial application (estimated requirement 302 
time is 3 years). The estimated cost of this biological control has been placed at $300 per 303 
hectare (G. Bourdôt pers. comm, 2013). The costs of applying the biocontrol S. sclerotiorum 304 
are estimated to be $26 per hectare, the same as the ground application of flumetsulam. Due 305 
to the high modelled cost of this biological control option, it is only considered applicable to 306 
use on dairy land as the profit margins for sheep and beef farming are not sufficient for this 307 
product to be economic at $326 per hectare. 308 
  309 
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 Results 310 
 311 
Figures 4 & 5, and Table 7 show that the spread of giant buttercup could cost New Zealand 312 
upwards of $18.8 billion over 18 years. The use of extra herbicides on affected pastures 313 
would mitigate almost 60% of these losses, and the use of the fungus Sclerotinia sclerotiorum 314 
as a bio-herbicide would mitigate almost 70%. 315 
 316 
Figure 4: The impact of giant buttercup on New Zealand dairy profits until 2030 317 
 318 
 319 
 320 
Table 7: Total change in dairy profits 2012-2030, for the Giant buttercup scenarios 321 
 
Total  
(milNZD) 
Mitigation  
(milNZD) 
Giant 
buttercup 
-18,810 - 
Herbicide use -7,621 11,189 
Biological 
control 
-6,042 12,767 
 322 
 323 
 324 
 325 
  326 
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 Figure 5: Total loss and mitigation in dairy profits 2012-2030, for the giant buttercup 327 
scenarios328 
 329 
 330 
 331 
Table 8 shows the total changes in each scenario averaged across the effected period. Giant 332 
buttercup causes a loss to dairy of almost a billion dollars a year. 333 
 334 
Table 8: Total change in dairy profits annuitized, for the giant buttercup scenarios 335 
 
Total  
(milNZD) 
Mitigation  
(milNZD) 
Giant buttercup -990 - 
Herbicide use -401 589 
Biological 
control 
-318 672 
 336 
Per hectare, shown in Table 9, the spread of giant buttercup would cost over $640, this would 337 
be reduced to approximately $245 with the use of flumetsulam, finally with the bio-herbicide, 338 
it would cost $194, mitigating $410 per hectare. 339 
Table 9: Total change in dairy profits annuitized per hectare (ha), for the giant 340 
buttercup scenarios 341 
 
Total  
(NZD) 
Mitigation  
(NZD) 
Giant buttercup -604.18 - 
Herbicide use -244.80 359.39 
Biological control -194.08 410.10 
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  342 
Scenario 3 343 
 344 
Glassy-winged sharpshooter 345 
The glassy-winged sharpshooter (GWSS), Homalodisca vitripennis, is a leafhopper insect 346 
native to Mexico, which can cause widespread damage to citrus trees, grape vines and arable 347 
crops through feeding and the spread of Pierce’s disease (PD).  348 
PD affects grape vines by blocking the plant’s xylem leading to vine death within one to five 349 
years. PD is caused by a strain of the bacterium Xylella fastidos, and there is no known cure 350 
for the disease or the direct prevention of it.  351 
While the GWSS causes damage to citrus trees through water loss associated with feeding, its 352 
main potential threat to the New Zealand agricultural industry is in its capibility to spread the 353 
bacterium that causes PD. This disease already exists in New Zealand, but there are currently 354 
no New Zealand vectors of the disease capable of tranferring the disease to grape vines. 355 
When the GWSS feeds on an infected plant, the disease-causing bacteria can attach to the 356 
sharpshooter’s mouth and colonise its gut, thereby providing a reservoir for the bacteria to be 357 
transferred to other plants. 358 
The GWSS spread to California in the late 1980s and from there has spread to French 359 
Polynesia in 1999, Hawaii in 2004 and the Cook Islands in 2007, showing the sharpshooter’s 360 
ability to be spread through air travel, and move closer to New Zealand. 361 
In California, the incursion of GWSS and the spread of PD is estimated to cost the 362 
Californian wine industry 110 million USD each year (Alston et al., 2012), $59 million of 363 
this is from the loss of productivity in grape growth, the remaining $51 million is spent on 364 
preventative measures and funding the Pierce’s Disease Control Program.  365 
The modelled scenario of the spread of GWSS to New Zealand focuses only on the impact on 366 
grape growers, although there is evidence that an incursion would also impact on citrus 367 
growers, and native trees and shrubs. 368 
The whole of New Zealand is thought to be climatically suitable for GWSS; however, PD is 369 
only severe in the United States where the average minimum January temperature is greater 370 
than 4.5C, thus it is only a threat to North Island grape growers.  371 
It is assumed that the spread of GWSS in New Zealand would be similar to its spread over 372 
California. Maps showing the prevalence of the GWSS in California from the Californian 373 
Department of Food and Agriculture show that it has spread approximatelly 600 miles over 374 
seven years, from this GWSS was modelled to be fully established across the North Island 375 
eight years after its first incursion. Following the establishment of the GWSS, grape yield’s 376 
are modelled as declining to zero over four years due to vine death associated with PD. 377 
 378 
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 Response 1: Replanting vines 379 
The first response scenario for the incursion of GWSS and PD is to uproot the vines and 380 
replant. This option is extremely costly, incurring both the cost of replanting all affected 381 
vines, but also the loss of revenue from a cessation of production as the new vines mature.  382 
In modelling, the new vines are assumed to take four years to mature. The capital costs of 383 
replanting per hectare, shown in Table 10, are spread over 30 years. 384 
Table 10:Replanting cost/hectare 385 
Cost of plant material $16,566 
Cost of vine guards $3,012 
Pulling old vines $8,031 
Planting vines $5,722 
Replanting $331 
Training for 3 years $1,807 
Total $35,469 
Lost grape income for 3 years $45,000 
Total $80,469 
Lost wine income for 3 years $195,840 
Total $276,309 
Source: G. Creasy, pers. comm., 10 Sep 2013 386 
The replanting of affected vines restores productivity; however, it does not grant any 387 
increased resistance against future incursions of GWSS. Future infections of the new vines 388 
are possible. This modelled response only simulates single replants with no second incursions 389 
within the shown period.  390 
 391 
Response 2: Biological control  392 
The second response scenario for the GWSS scenario is the establishment of a parasitoid of 393 
GWSS. Many species of parasitic wasps have been considered and used for the control of the 394 
GWSS in California. For this model, we focus on Gonatocerus ashmeadi, which has been 395 
used effectively in controlling the GWSS in Tahiti. G. ashmeadi is thought to have no 396 
negative effects on other New Zealand insect fauna (Biosecurity New Zealand), and thus 397 
could be introduced promptly following an outbreak of GWSS. 398 
G. ashmeadi has reduced populations of GWSS in Tahiti by over 90% one year after release, 399 
and up to 95% on eight islands across French Polynesia (Grandgirard et al., 2008).  400 
It has been argued that the colder climate of New Zealand will be less suitable for the 401 
establishment of G. ashmeadi (Charles & Logan, 2013), suggesting that the parasitoid may be 402 
less effective across the whole of New Zealand than it has been in California and the Pacific. 403 
In the warmer regions of the North Island the wasp should still be effective, although slower 404 
to respond to increases in populations of GWSS. As the model’s aim is only at assessing the 405 
impacts of the spread of PD on North Island vineyards, which are predominantly located in 406 
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 the warmer regions, we have assumed the wasp to be effective in areas with the GWSS. 407 
Given the success of G. ashmeadi in French Polynesia (Grandgirard et al., 2008) a 408 
conservative estimate of a 85% reduction in the populations of GWSS has been made. It is 409 
also presumed that the GWSS would take eight years to become established across the North 410 
Island.  411 
There have been no extra costs assumed for the establishment of G. ashmeadi, although it is 412 
recognised that this would incur costs via the New Zealand Environmental Protection 413 
Authority. 414 
Results 415 
The majority of New Zealand’s viticulture profits come from vineyards in the South Island, 416 
thus whilst the GWSS is expected to cause great losses in North Island vineyards, it would 417 
have a relatively small effect on New Zealand’s grape industry as a whole, as shown in 418 
Figure 6. 419 
 420 
Figure 6: The impact of the glassy-winged sharpshooter on New Zealand’s viticulture 421 
profits until 2030 422 
 423 
 424 
The effects on North Island growers is shown in Figures 7 & 8, and Table 11. The GWSS 425 
creates a steady decline in the profitablity of viticulture over the modelled period. Replanting 426 
creates a sharp decline, losing profitability swiftly as infected vines are uprooted, followed by 427 
a long plateau as the sharpshooter spreads causing additional vineyards to replant their vines. 428 
This period ends in 2026 where sufficient new vines have matured to compensate for areas 429 
still undergoing replanting. From this point the industry quickly recovers, although it will not 430 
reach base levels due to the continued incurred capital costs of replanting. 431 
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 Figure 7: The impact of the glassy-winged sharpshooter on North Island viticulture 432 
profits until 2030 433 
 434 
 435 
Table 11: Total change in viticulture profits 2012-2030, for the glassy-winged 436 
sharpshooter scenarios 437 
 
Total 
(milNZD) 
Mitigation  
(milNZD) 
Glassy-
winged 
sharpshooter 
-88.72 - 
Replanting -76.65 12.07 
Biological 
control 
-19.45 69.27 
 438 
  439 
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 Figure 8: Total loss and mitigation in viticulture profits 2012-2030, for the glassy-440 
winged sharpshooter scenarios 441 
 442 
 443 
The first response modelled for the advent of the GWSS was replanting affected vineyards. 444 
This is found to be ineffective for mitigation in the modelled period. Two additional 445 
considerations should be made regarding this response. First, is that over a longer period of 446 
modelling it would eventually be a profitable option if vineyards can remain in operation 447 
without production for the four years needed for new vines to mature. Second, there is no 448 
guarantee that secondary incursions of the GWSS and PD could not occur. With this in mind 449 
this recovery option is higly unsatisfactory, with high capital costs, risk of future infection 450 
and a four-year regrowth period without production for affected vineyards. 451 
Table 12 shows the change in profits annuitized over the modelled period, here glassy-452 
winged sharpshooter causes losses of almost 4 million NZD per hectare.The biological 453 
control response, G. ashmeadi, given the assumed rates of parasitism, mitigates over 85% of 454 
these losses. 455 
Table 12: Total change in viticulture profits annuitized, for the glassy-winged 456 
sharpshooter scenarios 457 
 
Total  
(milNZD) 
Mitigation  
(milNZD) 
Glassy-
winged 
sharpshooter 
-4.93 - 
Replanting -4.26 0.67 
Biological 
control 
-1.08 3.85 
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  458 
 459 
Table 13 shows the change in annuitized viticulture profits by hectare. The GWSS on average 460 
costs North Island viticulture $620.08 per hectare. Replanting vineyards over the modelled 461 
period mitigates on average almost $95 per hectare, although with future costs incurred. The 462 
biological control is most effective mitigation response over the modelled period, saving 463 
almost $550 per hectare per year in otherwise sustained losses.  464 
 465 
Table 13: Total change in viticulture profits annuitized per hectare, for the glassy-466 
winged sharpshooter scenarios 467 
 
Total  
(NZD) 
Mitigation 
(NZD) 
Glassy-winged 
sharpshooter 
-620.08 - 
Replanting -535.72 84.37 
Biological 
control 
-135.95 484.13 
 468 
Conclusions 469 
Biological control is a pivotal component of modern, science-led bioprotection. The broader 470 
literature suggests biological control of pests, weeds and plant diseases can be elegant, 471 
persistent, non-polluting and inexpensive, as well as conferring on businesses distinct 472 
marketing advantages. In fact, the benefit:cost ratios of many biological control successes 473 
have exceeded 300:1 (Gurr et al., 2012; Wratten et al., 2013). The analysis presented here 474 
takes a well-established New Zealand pest, a weed of which the importance is increasing and 475 
a serious insect pest that has reached the Pacific Islands and is expected here imminently. The 476 
analysis examines management options for these organisms, including biological control. 477 
Using resource-economics modelling techniques, the work shows that, taking selected 478 
internal and external factors into account, biological control is considered the most beneficial 479 
present and future option. The many negatives of persistent use of insecticides and herbicides 480 
are well known. To this should be added the fact that the rate of production of new pesticide 481 
molecules is currently at its lowest rate for 30 years.  482 
  483 
PeerJ PrePrints | https://peerj.com/preprints/140v1/ | v1 received: 4 Dec 2013, published: 4 Dec 2013, doi: 10.7287/peerj.preprints.140v1
P
re
P
rin
ts
  484 
References 485 
Alston JM, Fuller KB, Kaplan JD, Tumber KP. 2012. The economic consequences of 486 
Pierce’s disease and related policy in the California winegrape industry. Robert Mondavi 487 
Institute-Centre for Win Economics. Working Paper number 1202. July (revised Dec). 488 
Barlow ND, Goldson SL. 2002. Alien invertebrates in New Zealand. In: Pimentel D, ed. 489 
Environmental and economic costs of alien plant, animal, and microbe invasions. Biological 490 
invasions: economic and environmental costs of alien plant, animal, and microbe species. 491 
Boca Raton: CRC Press, 369.  492 
Biosecurity New Zealand. Glassy-winged sharpshooter factsheet. Available at 493 
http://www.biosecurity.govt.nz/files/pests/glassy-winged-sharpshooter/glassy-winged-494 
sharpshooter-booklet.pdf  (accessed 23rd August 2013). 495 
Bertram G. 1999. The impact of introduced pests on the New Zealand Economy. In: 496 
Hackwell K, Bertram G, ed. Pests and weeds; a blueprint for action. Wellington: New 497 
Zealand Conservation authority. 498 
 499 
Bourdôt GW, Lamoureaux S. 2002. Giant buttercup (Ranunculus acris L.) management in 500 
dairy pastures: current problems and future solutions. Proceedings of the New Zealand 501 
Grassland Association 64: 61-65. 502 
Bourdôt GW, Saville DJ, Crone D. 2003. Dairy production revenue losses in New Zealand 503 
due to giant buttercup (Ranunculus acris). New Zealand Journal of Agricultural Research 46: 504 
295-303. 505 
Bourdôt GW, Saville DJ. 2010. Giant buttercup - a threat to sustainable dairy farming in New 506 
Zealand. Proceedings of the 4th Australasian Dairy Science Symposium 2010: 355-359. 507 
AgResearch, Saville Statistical Consulting.  508 
Bourdôt GW, Warren K, Rennie G. 2012. Giant buttercup – modelling the financial benefits 509 
of control on a Golden Bay dairy farm. Proceedings of the New Zealand Grassland 510 
Association 74: 177-182. AgResearch. 511 
Charles JG, Logan DP. 2013. Predicting the distribution of Gonatocerus ashmeadi, an egg 512 
parasitoid of glassy winged sharpshooter, in New Zealand. New Zealand Entomologist 36:73-513 
81. 514 
Cornwallis LJ, Stewart A, Bourdôt GW, Gaunt RE, Harvey IC, Saville DJ. 1999. 515 
Pathogenicity of Sclerotinia sclerotiorum on Ranunculus acris in dairy pasture. Biocontrol 516 
Science and Technology 9:365-377. 517 
Gerard P, Smeaton D, Eerens H, Howlett S. 2007a. Economic and production impacts of 518 
clover root weevil on new zealand farming. Milestone report 7: The economic impact of 519 
clover root weevil. May. 520 
PeerJ PrePrints | https://peerj.com/preprints/140v1/ | v1 received: 4 Dec 2013, published: 4 Dec 2013, doi: 10.7287/peerj.preprints.140v1
P
re
P
rin
ts
 Gerard P, Hackell DL, Bell NL. 2007b. Impact of clover root weevil Sitona lepidus 521 
(Coleoptera: Curculionidae) larvae on herbage yield and species composition in a ryegrass-522 
white clover sward. New Zealand Journal of Agricultural Research 50:381-392. 523 
Gerard P, McNeill M, Wilson D, Phillips C. 2009. Biocontrol of clover root weevil. Report to 524 
Meat & Wool New Zealand Ltd. Client report number: SC110/2009/98. Dec. 525 
Goldson SL, Proffitt JR, Muscroft-Taylor KE. 1993. The economic value of achieving 526 
biological control of Sitona discoideus. In: Suckling DM, Popay AJ, eds. Plant Protection: 527 
costs, benefits and trade implications. New Zealand Plant Protection Society Inc., Caxton 528 
Press, Christchurch. 161. 529 
Goldson SL, Rowarth JS, Caradus JR. 2005. The impact of invasive invertebrate pests in 530 
pastoral agriculture: a review. New Zealand Journal of Agricultural Research 48:401-415. 531 
Goldson SL, Phillips CB, McNeill MR, Barlow ND. 1997. The potential of parasitoid strains 532 
in biological control: observations to date on Microctonus spp. intraspecific variation in New 533 
Zealand. Agriculture Ecosystems and Environment 64:115-124. 534 
Grandgirard J, Hoddle MS, Petit JN, Roderick GK, Davies N. 2008. Engineering an invasion: 535 
classical biological control of the glassy-winged sharpshooter, Homalodisca vitripennis, by 536 
the egg parasitoid Gonatocerus ashmeadi in Tahitiand Moorea, French Polynesia. Biological 537 
Invasions 10:135-148. 538 
Green S, Saville DJ, Bourdôt GW, Harvey IC, Field RJ, Close RC. 1993. Regeneration sites 539 
of Ranunculus acris are the target for Sclerotinia sclerotiorum, a potential mycoherbicide. 540 
Proceedings of the New Zealand Plant Protection Conference 46:274-277. 541 
Greer G, Saunders C. 2012. The costs of Psa-V to the New Zealand kiwifruit industry and the 542 
wider community. AERU: Research Report 327 May. Lincoln: Lincoln University. 543 
Gurr GM, Wratten SD, Snyder WE, Read DMY, eds. 2012. Biodiversity and insect pests: key 544 
issues for sustainable management. Chichester: Wiley Blackwell. 545 
Harris BM, Husband BM. 1997. Flumetsulam for control of giant buttercup in pasture. New 546 
Zealand Plant Protection 64:472-476. 547 
Harvey IC, Bourdôt G. 2001. Giant buttercup (Ranunculus acris L.) control in dairy pasture 548 
using a mycoherbicide based on Sclerotinia sclerotiorum. New Zealand Plant Protection 549 
54:120-124. 550 
McNeill MR, Proffitt JP, Gerard PJ, Goldson SL. 2006. Collections of Microctonus 551 
aethiopoides Loan (Hymenoptera: Braconidae) from Ireland. New Zealand Plant Protection 552 
59:290-296. 553 
 554 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (2011a). Farm Monitoring Report. National dairy model 555 
- 2010/11. Wellington: MAF. 556 
PeerJ PrePrints | https://peerj.com/preprints/140v1/ | v1 received: 4 Dec 2013, published: 4 Dec 2013, doi: 10.7287/peerj.preprints.140v1
P
re
P
rin
ts
 Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (2011b). Farm Monitoring Report. National sheep and 557 
beef model - 2010/11. Wellington: MAF. 558 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (2011c). Farm Monitoring Report. National Horticulture 559 
and Arable Overview - 2010/11. Wellington: MAF. 560 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (2011d). Situation and Outlook for New Zealand 561 
Agriculture and Forestry (SONZAF) 2011 - 2010/11. Wellington: MAF. 562 
Pangborn J, ed. 2010. Financial Budget Manual 2010. Lincoln: Lincoln University. 563 
Phillips CB, Hardwick S, McNeill MR, Ferguson CM. 2013. South Island distribution of 564 
CRW & its biocontrol agent. Innovative Farm Systems, AgResearch. Feb. 565 
Prestidge RA, Barker GM, Pottinger RP. 1991. The economic cost of Argentine stem weevil 566 
in pastures in New Zealand. Proceedings of the 44th New Zealand Weed and Pest Control 567 
Conference, 165-170. 568 
Statistics New Zealand. 2013. Gross domestic product: March 2013 quarter. Wellington. 569 
Suckling DM, Popay AJ. 1993. Plant protection: costs, benefits and trade implications. New 570 
Zealand Plant Protection Society Inc, Caxton Press, Christchurch. 161. 571 
Tait P, Cullen R. 2006. Some external costs of dairy farming in Canterbury. Paper presented 572 
at the 50th Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Annual Conference, 573 
Sydney, Australia, 8-10 Feb. 574 
Willoughby B, Addison P. 1997. Clover root weevil (Sitona lepidus) – a threat to the 575 
sustainability of white clover in New Zealand pastures? Proceedings of the New Zealand 576 
Grassland Association 59:23-27.  577 
Wear S, Andrews G. 2005. Clover root weevil economic impact assessment. Report to the 578 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. For Biosecurity New Zealand, Ministry of Agriculture 579 
and Forestry. New Zealand Institute of Economic Research.May.  580 
White TA, Gerard PJ. 2006. Modelling the farm scale impacts of clover root weevil 581 
herbivory. New Zealand Plant Protection 59:312-316. 582 
Wratten SD, Sandhu H, Cullen R, Costanza R, eds. 2013. Ecosystem services in agricultural 583 
and urban landscapes. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell 584 
PeerJ PrePrints | https://peerj.com/preprints/140v1/ | v1 received: 4 Dec 2013, published: 4 Dec 2013, doi: 10.7287/peerj.preprints.140v1
P
re
P
rin
ts
